Summary. Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both noncooperative and cooperative games. We identify a numberofshortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for social environments and propose a new concept called social rationalizability. The concept aims to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is shown to be non-empty for all social environments and it can be computed by an iterative reduction procedure. We introduce a de nition of coalitional rationality for social environments and show that it is satis ed by social rationalizability.
Introduction
Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions of individuals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families production is carried out by rms which are large coalitions of owners of di erent factors of production workers are organized in trade unions or professional associations public goods are produced within a complex coalition structure of federal, state, and local jurisdictions political life is conducted through political parties and interest groups and individuals belong to networks of formal and informal social clubs.
The framework of social environments as introduced in Chwe 4 ] (see also Rosenthal 9] ) speci es what each coalition can do if and when it forms. It is general enough to integrate the representation of a cooperative game, an extensive-form game with perfect information, and a normal-form game played in such a fashion that there are coalitional moves and countermoves. An example is the coalitional contingent threat situation due to Greenberg 5] . For social environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions are public, Chwe 4] and Xue 14] have proposed the solution concepts of the largest consistent set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respectively. The solution concepts predict which coalitions structures are possibly stable and could emerge. 1 Both approaches have a n umber of nice features. Firstly, they do not rely on a very detailed description of the coalition formation process as noncooperative sequential games do, see e.g. Bloch 3 ] . 2 No commitment assumption is imposed. Secondly, it incorporates the farsightedness of the coalitions. A coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit. The main di erence between Chwe 4] and Xue 14] is that Xue's approach strengthens the farsightedness notion. A farsighted individual considers only the nal outcomes that might result when making choices. But, an individual with perfect foresight considers also how nal outcomes can be reached. That is, possible deviations along the way to the nal outcomes should be considered. 3 1 For a very speci c social environment, namely the coalitional contingent threat situation, Mariotti 7] has de ned an equilibrium concept: the coalitional equilibrium. Central to his concept is the notion of coalitional strategies and the similarity with subgame perfection (except that coalitions are formally treated as players). 2 Sequential coalition formation games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition formation process and rely on the commitment assumption. Once some individuals have agreed to form a coalition they are committed to remain in that coalition. They can neither leave the coalition nor propose to change it later on. 3 In Chwe 4 ] the speci cation of how individuals view and use their alternatives is formalized by the indirect dominance relation which captures some farsightedness of the individuals. In Xue 14] it is formalized by means of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg 5] . A social situation allows to capture perfect foresight (which strengthens farsightedness) by extending the von Neumann and Morgenstern 13] notion of stability t o accommodate di erent behavior on the part of the individuals in terms of their Knightian (pessimism or optimism) attitude towards uncertainty.
Both approaches su er from a numberof drawbacks as well, some of them pointed out by the authors themselves. For instance, as indicated in Chwe 4] , the largest consistent set may fail to satisfy the requirement of individual rationality. An individual that is given the choice between two m o ves, where one yields with certainty a higher payo than the other, might c hoose the move leading to the lower payo according to the largest consistent set. This is perhaps somewhat less disturbing than it seems at rst sight, since the largest consistent set aims to be a weak concept, a concept that rules out with con dence. It is therefore more surprising, as we show in this paper, that in certain social environments the largest consistent set may rule out too much. One drawback of boththe optimistic and the conservative stable standards of behavior of Xue 14] , is that both solution sets may b e e m p t y. This is worrisome as the idea of farsightedness suggests that since coalitions do take i n to account the far reaching consequences of their moves, they should be able to settle on some stable outcomes at least. We also present a n umber of examples where the stable standards of behavior lead to undesirable outcomes, for instance that both OSSB and even CSSB may rule out too little, or even worse, too much.
We aim for a solution concept that identi es the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments, and that remedies the problems mentioned above. To a c hieve this goal, we propose to extend the rationalizability approach of Bernheim 2] and Pearce 8] to the framework of social environments. We use a cautious version of rationalizability that is also analyzed in Herings and Vannetelbosch 6] . Since social environments deal with the behavior of coalitions, whereas rationalizability i s a b o u t the implications of rationality of individuals, we h a ve t o c o n vert coalitional behavior into individual behavior. This is achieved by recognizing that individual participation in a coalition is basically characterized by two possibilities. An individual may either agree to a coalitional move, or object to it and block it. Unlike in non-cooperative game theory, in a social environment s e v eral coalitions may and could be willing to move at the same time. Con icts of interest may arise, which can take the form of one coalition trying to preempt the move of another coalition, but also of coordination problems in and between coalitions. Individuals should therefore also have beliefs on how s u c h con icts of interest are solved.
The equilibrium approach assumes that individuals have common expectations about their behaviors. That is, each individual holds a correct conjecture about the behavior of every other individual. But once we admit the possibility that an individual may have several behaviors that she could reasonably take, conjectures and behaviors actually played may be mismatched. This is what distinguishes the rationalizability approach from the equilibrium one. Indeed, in the rationalizability approach, the conjectures are not assumed to becorrect, but are only constrained by considerations of rationality. Each individual believes that the behavior taken by every other individual is a best response to some conjecture on every other individual's behavior, and, further, each individual assumes that every other individual reasons in this way and hence thinks that every other individual believes that every other individual's behavior is a best response to some conjecture, and so on. In other words, the individual rationality o f t h e individuals is common knowledge.
We i n troduce two alternative de nitions of the social rationalizability concept which w e show to be equivalent de nitions. The rst one is strongly in uenced by Battigalli's 1] extensive-form rationalizability. It is based on two assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. Central to our new concept are the notions of individual behavior and of implementability priorbelief. An individual behavior describes, for each history, the coalitional moves the individual agrees to join and those she decides to block. Beliefs about which agreement is implemented among the set of agreements are derived from an implementability prior-belief over the entire set of feasible moves. Our second de nition is motivated by P earce's 8] original extensive-form rationalizability and is based on a reduction procedure. 4 We show the equivalence of our two de nitions of social rationalizability.
Our main results are the following. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is nonempty for the entire class of social environments. When we apply social rationalizability to the prisoner's dilemma, it follows that cooperation is sustained. Social environments deal with coalitional moves. It is therefore important that social rationalizability not only guarantees individual rationality, but also coalitional rationality. Among a set of Pareto ranked alternatives a coalition should beable to coordinate on the Pareto optimal one. Social rationalizability is shown to satisfy coalitional rationality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we i n troduce some notations and primitives. We present the solution concepts of Chwe 4] and Xue 14] , and we give the motivation for introducing a new concept. In Section 3 we propose two alternative de nitions of social rationalizability and we show the equivalence of bothof them. The examples are reconsidered and solved by our concept. In Section 4 we study the property of coalitional rationality and show i t is satis ed by social rationalizability. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 4 Other papers related to extensive-form rationalizability (EFR) are among others Bernheim 2] , who introduced subgame-perfect rationalizability, Shimoji and Watson 10] , who studied the equivalence between conditional dominance and EFR, and Vannetelbosch 11] , 12], who de ned rationalizability f o r m ulti-stage bargaining games.
Social Environments

Notations and Primitives
As in Chwe 4 ] a n d X u e 1 4 ] , w e de ne by ; = I Z (u i ) i2I f! S g S I S 6 = a social environment, where I = f1 2 ::: #Ig is the set of individuals, Z is the nite set of outcomes, f! S g S I S 6 = are e ectiveness relations de ned on Z, and for every individual i 2 I, u i : Z ! R is her utility function. We denote by #I the cardinality o f I. The relation ! S represents what coalition S can do: x 0 ! S x 1 means that if x 0 is the status-quo, coalition S can make x 1 the new status-quo.
It does not mean that coalition S can enforce x 1 no matter what anyone else does after S moves to x 1 from x 0 , another coalition S 0 might m o ve t o x 2 , where x 1 ! S 0 x 2 . A priori no restrictions are imposed on the e ectiveness relations f! S g S I S 6 = . For example, the e ectiveness relation can be empty, x 0 ! S x 0 might be possible, and x 0 ! S x 1 does not imply x 1 ! S x 0 . All actions or moves are public and the individuals care only about the end outcome, not how it is reached. Conventional game theoretic situations can be modeled as a social environment. For social environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions are public, Chwe 4] and Xue 14] have proposed interesting concepts, the largest consistent set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respectively, to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable or could emerge.
The Largest Consistent Set
Based on the indirect dominance relation, Chwe 4] (ii) is a CSSB if 8x 2 Z, 2 x n (x) () 9 S I, y 2 , and z 2 Z such that y ! S z and 8 2 (z) 6 = : u i ( ) < u i ( ) 8i 2 S:
Motivation and Examples
As has already been mentioned by C h we 4] himself, the LCS is blurring or avoiding important issues, and hence, su ers substantial drawbacks. One drawback is that the LCS does not incorporate any idea of bestresponse. Thereby, it is not very surprising that the LCS does not always rule out all unreasonable moves. that is currently at the status quo x 0 where she gets 1 unit of utility. She has the possibility to move to outcome x 1 and obtain 2 units of utility, or to go to outcome x 2 and receive 3 units of utility. In the social environment of Figure 1 , LCS(;) = fx 1 x 2 g: This is unreasonable as a simple optimization dictates individual 1 to move to x 2 in order to get a utility equal to 3 instead of 2. So, the LCS does not satisfy individual rationality. It is more surprising that we h a ve found social environments where LCS rules out too much. This problem is more serious as LCS is developed to be a weak concept that rules out with con dence. In the social environment of Figure The OSSB seems to perform better than LCS for the social environment of Figure 2 . It holds that the unique OSSB is de ned by (x 0 ) = f(x 0 )g (x 1 ) = f(x 1 x 2 x 3 )g (x 2 ) = f(x 2 ) (x 2 x 3 )g and (x 3 ) = f(x 3 )g. The uniqueness of OSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue 14] . So individual 1 will not make the move from x 0 to x 1 because she fears the move of individual 2 from x 1 to x 2 . Less convincing is that (x 1 x 2 ) = 2 (x 1 ). Individual 2 hopes for the b e s t , s o h e i s c o n vinced that individual 3 moves from x 2 to x 3 . This is not consistent w i t h t h e fact that (x 2 ) c o n tains both (x 2 ) and (x 2 x 3 ).
The CSSB is a truly weak concept. It doesn't rule out anything in the social environment of Figure 2 . But even though a CSSB is typically a very weak concept, it may also rule out too much. In the social environment of Figure 3 there is a unique CSSB, given by (x 0 ) = (x 1 ) = f(x 1 )g and (x 2 ) = f(x 2 )g. The uniqueness of CSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue behavior that prescribes (x 0 ) = f(x 0 x 1 ) (x 0 x 2 )g violates internal stability when one also assigns the obvious (x 1 ) = f(x 1 )g and (x 2 ) = f(x 2 )g since (x 0 x 2 ) 2 (x 0 ) x 0 ! f1g x 1 and
The unique OSSB coincides with the CSSB for the social environment o f F i g u r e 3 , a n d m a y therefore also be empty-valued and rule out too much, a feature that is less surprising for OSSB. (x 0 ) = f(x 0 ) (x 0 x 1 ) (x 0 x 2 )g (x 1 ) = f(x 1 )g and (x 2 ) = f(x 2 )g is both the unique CSSB and the unique OSSB. It may l o o k l i k e this phenomenon is caused by the absence of the no-move.
But even if we add moves x 0 ! f1g x 0 x 0 ! f2g x 0 x 0 ! f1 2g x 0 , then the standard of behavior de ned by (x 0 ) = f(x 0 ) (x 0 x 1 ) (x 0 x 2 ) (x 0 x 0 ) (x 0 x 0 x 1 ) (x 0 x 0 x 2 ) (x 0 x 0 x 0 ) g (x 1 ) = f(x 1 )g and (x 2 ) = f(x 2 )g is a CSSB. OSSB seems to do betternow, as the unique OSSB is given by (x 0 ) = f(x 0 ) (x 0 x 0 ) (x 0 x 0 x 0 ) g (x 1 ) = f(x 1 )g and (x 2 ) = f(x 2 )g.
In order to remedy these drawbacks, we propose a notion of rationalizability for social environments, which i d e n ti es the coalitions that are likely to form and the outcomes that might occurwhen (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo.
3 Rationalizable Social Behaviors
Individual and Social Behaviors
In what follows, we denote the move of coalition S from x to y, x ! S y, by (xy S). The no-move at status-quo x is denoted by (xx ). One has to distinguish between (xx ) and 2 N) ,w e c a l l h j a sub-history of h k if h j consists of the rst j elements of h k , and we write h j h k . A history is di erent from a path as used in the theory of stable standards of behavior. A path only gives a sequence of outcomes, whereas for a history it also matters which coalition made the move from one outcome to another.
The set of feasible moves after history h is denoted by M (h) = fm 2 Mj h + = m ; g n f (h + h + )g for all h. It does not include the no-move. Let M i (h) = f(xy S) 2 M (h)j i 2 Sg be the set of feasible moves after history h involving individual i. The set of individuals that has a move after history h is denoted I (h) = fi 2 Ij M i (h) 6 = g.
We denote by H the set of all histories with nite length and by H(J) the set of histories with at most J moves. That is, H (J) = fh 2 Hj l (h) J + 1 g. Temporarily we x J and consider only histories in H(J). Let H i (J) = fh 2 H (J)j M i (h) 6 = g. It is the set of histories that contain at most J moves and after which individual i is involved in a move. Individual i's opponents are denoted by ;i. As general notation, we denote by ( X) the set of all probability measures on X. For nite X, we denote by 0 (X) the set of all probability measures giving positive probability to each memberofX.
A social behavior selects after any history a unique move or a no-move. We denote it by b = (b (h)) h2H(J) where b (h) 2 M(h) f (h + h + )g. Let B bethe set of all social behaviors.
Our aim is to nd those social behaviors that are rationalizable. From the rationalizable social behaviors, we derive the set of outcomes that are stable. We aim for a concept that is weak, so rules out with con dence. To do this, we examine individual behaviors rst.
We model an individual behavior as, for each history, the set of coalitional moves the individual agrees to join and those she decides to block. Observe that the framework of social environments does not exclude that an individual might agree to join more than one coali- 
Individual behaviors depend on histories only. In particular, individual behaviors are not allowed to depend on the set of moves on which there has been agreement in the past. One interpretation consistent with such individual behaviors is that after each history the individuals behaviors are transmitted to a mediator, which determines a move in the set of moves on which there is agreement, or selects the no-move when no agreement is possible. The mediator reports this move in the agreement set or the no-move to the individuals, but not the agreement set itself. A pro le of individual behaviors induces a social behavior or a numberofsocial behaviors. A social behavior is induced by a pro le of individual behaviors if for each history the move prescribed by the social behavior is a move on which there is agreement by all individuals involved in the move, or the no-move when no agreement is possible. The basis for rationalizability is that individuals form conjectures about each others' behavior and then optimize subject to these conjectures. We restrict the individuals to hold uncorrelated 
Beliefs, Conjectures and
Social Rationalizability
We next propose two alternative de nitions of social rationalizability which we show to be equivalent. The rst one is strongly in uenced by Battigalli's 1] extensive-form rationalizability and is based on the notion of a hierarchy of nested hypotheses. The second one is motivated by Pearce's 8] original extensive-form rationalizability and is based on a reduction procedure. 7 The concept of social rationalizability based on the approach of Battigalli is based on two assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy o f h ypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. A rational individual i maximizes her expected payo at each history h reached by the play, subject to her consistent updating system of conjectures, c i .
De The set P 1 (J) = lim n!1 P n is the set of rationalizable individual behaviors where histories contain at most J moves.
Theorem 1 claims that the two de nitions of social rationalizability are equivalent. Throughout the rest of the paper we focus on social rationalizability a l a P earce.
Theorem 1 For all n 0 R n = P n .
Proof. Obviously, R 0 = P 0 : We give a proof by induction, so suppose R n;1 = P n;1 : Consider some b i 2 R n i : Since R n R n;1 = P n;1 it holds that b i 2 P Consider some b i 2 P n i : Since P n P n;1 = R n;1 it holds that b i 2 R n; i c i q i ) for all b b i 2 P n;1 i . It follows that b i 2 P n i , so P n 6 = .
Since P 0 is nite and P n P n+1 , there is N such that P n = P n 0 for all n n 0 N. It follows that P 1 (J) = P N 6 = . Any ( b i ) i2I 2 P 1 (J) yields a social behavior b 2 S 1 (J), so S 1 (J) 6 = and as a consequence Z 1 J (x 0 ) 6 = . As a subset of the nite set Z it holds that Z 1 J (x 0 ) is nite.
Now it follows from the de nition of the limit superior that Z 1 (x 0 ) 6 = .
We reconsider the ve examples and we s h o w that social rationalizability remedies the problems of the largest consistent set, the optimistic stable standard of behavior, and the conservative stable standard of behavior. Even though the de nitions so far may seem rather complicated, the examples are easily solved for by the reduction procedure of De nition 5. Hence, the unique optimal behavior for individual 2 is b 2 ((x 1 x 2 f2g) j h 2 ) = 1, and P 1 2 is a proper subset of B 2 : P 1 2 = f1g. Initially, individual 1 puts positive probability weight on all behaviors of 2 and 3, and depending on her conjectures she decides to stay at x 0 or to move to x 1 , so P 1 1 = B 1 . However, in the second iteration she knows that individual 2 will move to x 2 for sure when given the move: any c 1 (h 1 ) 2 0 (P 1 2 ) 0 (P 1 3 ) gives probability one to b 2 ((x 1 x 2 f2g) j h 2 ) = 1 . Therefore, the unique optimal behavior for individual 1 is to stay a t x 0 : b 1 ((x 0 x 1 f1g) j h 1 ) = 0 . So, P 1 1 = f0g, P 1 2 = f1g and P 1 3 q h k i ) a n d q h k i is the probability assigned by the implementability prior-belief of individual i that her move will be implemented after h k if both individuals decide to move. Table 1 Using the symmetry of the prisoners' dilemma it is straightforward that all b 2 2 B 2 belong to P 1 2 . So, applying social rationalizability to the prisoners' dilemma, we obtain for J = 2 that all behaviors are rationalizable: P 1 i = B i = P 1 i , i = 1 2, and Z 1 1  48  1  48  1  40  1  40  1  48  2  48  1  40   (0 0 1)   1  40  1  48  1  48  1  40  1  40  1  48  3  8  1  40 ( 
Coalitional Rationality
Social rationalizability is based on common knowledge of individual rationality. An interesting theory of social behavior should also be expected to satisfy at least some rudimentary forms of coalitional rationality. It is conceivable that coalitions fail to choose between a set of outcomes, because of internal disputes on the outcome on which to coordinate. If, on the other hand, the outcomes are Pareto ranked, then a sensible concept of coalitional rationality should prescribe coordination on the outcome that Pareto dominates all the others. We can formalize this within the theory of social environments. In Table 2 Table 2 : Unique best response, conjecture and belief.
In the second iteration, individual i knows that individual j will play a behavior in P Z 1 (x 0 ) = fx 3 g. In Example 6, the case with two individuals and three Pareto ranked moves, the property of coalitional rationality is satis ed. There is a unique socially rationalizable outcome and it is the Pareto-dominant o n e .
We s h o w that the coalitional rationality property holds in general in the social environment ; . In order to do so we use the following ve lemmas. Lemma 1 tells us that if a behavior of individual i is the unique best response against a conjecture c i (possibly degenerate) and a belief q i , then it is also the unique bestresponse against some cautious conjecture c i and the belief q i . The above result implies that social rationalizability satis es the property of coalitional rationality. When the outcomes can be Pareto ranked, a coalition selects the Pareto-dominant outcome. Each individual only agrees to move to the Pareto dominating outcome, and blocks all other moves.
Corollary 1 Consider the social environment ; . We have Z 1 (x 0 ) = fx N g.
Conclusion
Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. We have argued for the need of a new solution concept for social environments that is based on individual rationality, called social rationalizability. One of the basic steps in our construction is to model individual behavior in a social environment, which m a k es a social environment apt to an analysis based on individual rationality. Individual behavior within a coalition is modeled as the decision to agree to a coalitional move or to block it. Since a coalition may h a ve several moves available, and more than one coalition may h a ve the option to move at the same time, there can be many m o ves on which there is agreement. Individuals therefore also form beliefs on which m o ve in the set of moves on which there is agreement will be carried out.
Social rationalizability identi es which coalitions are likely to form and which outcomes might occur when (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy o f h ypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. We h a ve shown that for all social environments the set of socially rationalizable outcomes is non-empty. The computation of the set of socially rationalizable outcomes is greatly simpli ed by using a reduction procedure, which we s h o w t o b e e q u i v alent to the formal de nition of social rationalizability.
Social rationalizability a i m s to bea weak concept that rules out with con dence. Its nonemptiness makes it applicable to cases where traditional solution concepts fail to make predictions. It is also not too weak in the sense that it satis es individual rationality. As a theory of social behavior, social rationalizability should also beconsistent with elementary notions of coalitional rationality. For instance, when a coalition has to choose between a numberofPareto ranked moves, it should select the Pareto dominating one for sure. It is shown that social rationalizability is consistent with coalitional rationality.
